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Abstract 
We present a stress testing approach based on a dynamic model of default.  Retail 
credit models are implemented using discrete survival analysis which enables 
macroeconomic conditions to be included directly as time-varying covariates. In 
consequence, these models can be used for stress testing by determining changes in 
default given downturn economic scenarios.  In particular Monte Carlo simulation is 
used to generate a distribution of estimated default rates from which extreme Value at 
Risk and expected shortfall are computed.  Several macroeconomic variables are 
considered and factor analysis is employed to model the structure between these 
variables.  Two large UK data sets are used to test this approach, resulting in plausible 
dynamic models and stress test outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
Stress tests have become increasingly important in evaluating the riskiness of bank 
loan portfolios and they are recognised as a key tool in helping financial institutions 
make business strategy, risk management and capital planning decisions (FSA 2008).  
They allow us to ask what level of losses we can expect given worst case scenarios 
when taking a number of risk factors into account.  Stress tests should take into 
consideration unexpected but also plausible events from which unexpected losses can 
be computed.  In turn regulatory and economic capital can be computed as required 
by the Basel II Accord (BCBS 2005). Most models of default for retail credit are 
either point in time (PIT) or through the cycle (TTC), neither of which are able to give 
good estimates of default rate on a portfolio through the business cycle since in the 
first case, PIT will reflect the conditions of a particular point in the business cycle and 
in the second case, TTC models will reflect average conditions.  Unlike previous 
literature we consider a form of dynamic model of consumer default that includes 
time varying macroeconomic conditions and we use it to consider losses during 
downturn periods and as the basis of a principled approach to stress testing a 
portfolio.  We present such a stress test of a portfolio. 
 
Bellotti and Crook (2009) use a Cox Proportional Hazards survival model of time to 
default.  This model has the advantage that macroeconomic time series data can be 
included in a principled way into the model as time varying covariates.  They show 
that the inclusion of macroeconomic variables such as bank interest rates and earnings 
was significant and had the expected effect: that is, an increase in interest rates tends 
to raise risk of default whilst a rise in earnings tends to lower risk of default.  We 
develop this method by building discrete time survival models of default with 
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macroeconomic conditions on two different large credit card data sets.  The 
advantages of this approach are that (1) the model reflects the discrete nature of 
accounts data, in our case it is monthly, (2) the model build is quicker and (3) the 
procedure for forecasting using this model is less complex.  Discrete time survival 
models have been used to model corporate bankruptcy without macroeconomic 
variables (Shumway 2001, Cheng et al 2009), and personal bankruptcy (Gross and 
Souleles 2002) and mortgage foreclosures (Gerardi et al 2008) with macroeconomic 
variables, but none of these papers show how the models can be used for stress 
testing.  Breedon and Thomas (2008) use a dynamic model to stress test over several 
scenarios from past economic crises.  They identify a number of important 
macroeconomic indicators of default such as interest rate and GDP but do not build 
distributions of estimated default rates.   
 
The use of scenario-based stress tests is now common in the regulation of banks 
(Hoggarth and Whitley 2003, FSA 2008, FRS 2009).  This approach is based on 
selecting hypothetical economic scenarios using judgements supported by prior 
economic knowledge and considering plausible developments of the economy.  
However, this approach is problematic since it allows a high degree of subjective 
judgement in the selection process.  For example, recent stress tests of major US 
banks (FRS 2009) have been criticized since the “more adverse” conditions it uses are 
considered too weak.  For example, the estimate for adverse 2009 unemployment rate 
was already exceeded within the year.  Baker (2009) estimates that the US stress test 
could have under-estimated losses by $120 billion.  Clearly, the recent financial crisis 
has shown that past stress tests failed, since banks and regulators were left surprised 
by levels of losses.  Haldane (2009) gives several reasons for this failure.  One is that 
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the banking system has not taken all risk factors into account or has under-estimated 
their effect (disaster myopia).  A second is that banks never had internal incentives to 
conduct stress tests seriously (misaligned incentives).  It is clear that further rigour is 
required in the stress testing process.  
 
In this paper we consider Monte Carlo simulation for stress testing of consumer credit 
portfolios as an alternative to a scenario-based approach.  This is a statistical and 
computational method which is less subjective than scenario selection, since scenarios 
are automatically simulated based on historical distributions of risk factors.  There 
remains a subjective judgement in the selection of risk factors themselves.  Monte 
Carlo simulation is a standard approach for stress testing of corporate credit (Marrison 
2002), although we have seen no published account of its use for retail credit.  Monte 
Carlo simulation generates a distribution of estimated loss.  It is common to use Value 
at Risk (VaR) to compute extreme loss based on this distribution.  However, there is a 
distinction between VaR and the requirements of stress testing since VaR captures 
worst case in normal circumstances, whereas stress testing attempts to capture losses 
given unusual circumstances.  There is a connection between the two, but a noticeable 
difference in value can emerge when considering non-linear exposures or fat-tail loss 
distributions (BIS 2005).  For this reason we also report expected shortfall for worst 
case scenarios.  To generate economic simulations, it is necessary to model the 
structure of the macroeconomic data.  We use principal component analysis (PCA) to 
derive key macroeconomic factors (MF) which are used in the default model.  Factor 
analysis has been used successfully to model macroeconomic conditions; for example, 
the Chicago Fed National Activity Index is a highly regarded and reliable factor 
representing the US economy (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2001). 
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Dynamic models of default including macroeconomic conditions are built for two 
large UK portfolios of credit cards and used to conduct plausible stress tests using a 
simulation approach.  In section 2 we describe our modelling and stress testing 
methods, in section 3 we describe our data and give results and in section 4 we 
discuss our conclusions. 
 
2. Method 
We employ a discrete time logit survival model to estimate a dynamic model of 
default.  We then use Monte Carlo simulation to generate distributions of estimated 
default rate across an aggregate of accounts.  We discuss each of these techniques in 
the following subsections. 
2.1 Dynamic model of default 
We consider a panel data set of credit card accounts.  For each account i we have the 
following data: ia  is the date of account opening; itd  indicates whether the account i 
defaults at some time t after account opening (0=non-default, 1=default); iw  is a 
vector of account-level static variables; and itx  is a vector of lagged behavioural 
variables.  Additionally, we have macroeconomic variables which have the same 
value for all accounts on the same date:  itz  is a vector of macroeconomic variables 
such that for any two accounts i, j with duration times t and s respectively, if 
sata ji +=+  then jsit zz = .  Probability of default (PD) for each account i at time t 
is modelled using 
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where tα  is a fixed effect for time t and 321 ,, βββ  are coefficients that need to be 
estimated.  We use a logit link function ( )xexF −+= 11)(  .  We denote a specific 
model parameterization by ( )3211 ,,,,, βββθ Tαα L= . A standard software package 
can be used to estimate this model using maximum likelihood estimation.  Since we 
model default conditional on no previous default for the same account, this is the Cox 
discrete survival model and the series of fixed effects tα  form a baseline hazard 
function. It follows from this conditionality that dependency of observations within 
each account is not a problem since probabilities of events factor out (see Allison 
1995, chapter 7).   
 
2.2 Default rate estimates, Value at Risk and expected shortfall 
For a given calendar date c, the default rate for an aggregate of N accounts that remain 
open on that date is given by  
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which, assuming independence between default events implies that the expected 
default rate is 
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1 .    (3) 
This is our usual point prediction of default rate.  However, for stress testing we are 
interested in a distribution of estimated default rate given changes in the economy, so 
we consider the cumulative probability distribution over default rates given by 
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( ) ( )∫ ≤=≤ z zzθθ dzpyDPyDP cc )(,||     (4) 
for some density function p across economic conditions z.  Distribution (4) can be 
used to compute extreme estimates of default rate.  In particular, Value at Risk (VaR) 
for percentile q is given by the smallest value qV  such that ( ) 100/| qVDP qc ≥≤ θ .  
Then expected shortfall is computed as the mean value for the worst case scenarios in 
the distribution above percentile q: 
( ) ( )∫∞=− ==≥= qVy cqqccq dyyDyPVDDES θθ |,| 100/1 1    (5) 
 
In addition to macroeconomic risk factors, we also need to consider noise in the data, 
relative to the model, as a risk factor in estimating default rates, since this will effect 
the distribution of outcomes. These are introduced by considering the model as a 
latent model with a residual term itε  independent of all covariates and independently 
distributed in F: 
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where ( )⋅I  is the indicator function (see Verbeek 2004, section 7.1.3).  Then 
substituting (6) into (2) we have default rate in terms of the model, macroeconomic 
conditions z and a vector of N residual terms ( ) ( )( )Nεε ,,1 L=ε   as 
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Then ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )∫ ≤′=≤′=≤ ε εεεzθzθεzθzθ dpyDyDPyDP ccc ,,I,|,,,|  where ( )εp  
is the probability given that each residual is drawn independently from F.  
Substituting into (4) and assuming independence between z and ε  gives 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )∫ ≤′=≤ zε zεzεεzθθ , )(,,I| ddppyDyDP cc    (8) 
2.2 Monte Carlo simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is a means to compute integrals across distributions of values. 
In general, if ( )( ) ( ) ( )∫= χ dxxfxhXhfE , where χ  is uni- or multi-dimensional, then 
given large m, ( )∑
=
=
m
j
jm xhh
1
 is a good approximation, and converges in the limit, to 
( )( )XhfE , where each jx  is a random draw (simulation) from the density function f  
(Robert and Casella 1999).  Suppose, then, that for j=1 to m, jz′  and jε′  are randomly 
generated from distributions for ( )zp  and ( )εp  respectively and indexed such that 
simulated default rates are in ascending order: that is, for all jh ≤ , 
( ) ( )jjchhc DD εzεz ′′′≤′′′ ,, .  Then, by Monte Carlo simulation, (8) is approximated as 
( ) ( )( )∑
=
≤′≈≤
m
j
cc yDm
yDP
1
,,I1| εzθθ .   (9) 
The number of iterations m is chosen such that (9) converges to a stable value which 
is data dependent.  Since the definition of cD′  (7) involves an indicator function over a 
threshold term for default, this simulation can be interpreted as simulating default or 
non-default events for each account in the data set, depending on the risk factors. In 
this sense it can be viewed as following the final simulation step used by Jokivuolle et 
al (2008) in their work on stress testing capital requirements for corporate data.  From 
the definition of VaR and the ordering of simulated default rates it follows that 
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤( )100/100/ , mqmqcq DV εz ′′′≈      (10) 
Similarly (5) gives 
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It is easy to generate the residual terms by repeatedly sampling from F, which here is 
the standard logit distribution.  However, the distribution over macroeconomic 
conditions ( )zp  requires that the structure amongst the macroeconomic variables is 
modelled.  This can be done using Cholesky decomposition which preserves the 
covariance structure between simulated variables (Marrison 2002).  However an 
alternative is to apply principal component analysis (PCA) to the macroeconomic 
series prior to including them in the model. PCA is a well-known technique which 
generates a series of components that are a linear combination of a set of random 
variables such that the first component accounts for as much of the variability in the 
data as possible, the second component is orthogonal to the first whilst accounting for 
as much of the remainder of the variance, and so on.  The problem is well-posed and 
is solved by finding eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix of data.  For factor 
analysis, it is conventional to retain all components with eigenvalues greater than 1.  
For details, see Joliffe (2002).  Hence, instead of including raw macroeconomic time 
series, we use macroeconomic factors (MF) instead.  This is suitable since the factors 
will not be correlated with one another, therefore they can be generated independently 
in the simulation process.   The macroeconomic values are drawn from the historical 
distribution of the factors.  These are not necessarily normal, so we use the Box-Cox 
transformation to model each factor distribution and convert to normal. Box and Cox 
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(1964) show how to transform a given random variable x with the goal of producing 
an approximately normal distribution.  They use the general form  
( )
( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=+
≠−+=
0 iflog
0 if1*
λ
λλ
λ
kx
kx
x     (11) 
where k is a fixed parameter to allow for negative values of x and λ  is a parameter 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood of the transformed values, assuming they are 
generated from a normal distribution.   
2.3 Validation of stress tests 
To compare and contrast using different risk factors for stress testing, three discrete 
survival models are built: No MF: A simple model without any MFs, All MF: A 
model including all MFs and Selected MF: A model including only MFs selected 
using stepwise variable selection.  These three models form the basis of three stress 
tests using different risk factors. The No MF model is used for stress tests when only 
noise in accounts is assumed; the All MF model tests for when all macroeconomic 
conditions are included; and the Selected MF model tests for when macroeconomic 
conditions are selectively included in the stress test. The Selected MF model is 
required since not all MFs are likely to be relevant risk factors and for stress testing, 
their inclusion may therefore lead to inaccurate estimates of extreme values.  This is 
particularly true if any MFs are correlated within the period of the training data which 
may lead to multicollinearity and therefore poor estimates for coefficient estimates
1.  This is unlikely to be a problem for prediction, when distributions of risk factor 
values in the forecast data would be expected to follow those in the training data, but 
for stress testing, when extreme values of risk factors are considered, it will more 
                                                 
1 Although factors will be uncorrelated over the period of PCA, this does not imply they are uncorrelated for any 
sub-period. 
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likely have a noticeable effect.  By including both the All MF and Selected MF 
models, this hypothesis may be tested. Additionally, the coefficient estimates of the 
model can themselves be a risk factor, since they are not exact estimates but have a 
distribution governed by a covariance matrix which is the outcome of the maximum 
likelihood procedure.  During simulation, these estimates can be adjusted to determine 
the effect of estimation uncertainty on the loss distribution.  For this reason, we also 
include a fourth stress test using the Selected MF model with estimation uncertainty. 
 
A serious weakness of stress tests is that they cannot be easily validated since extreme 
events are both rare and unique.  Their rarity means we are unlikely to have past 
extreme events for testing and even if we do their uniqueness means it is difficult to 
apply statistical analysis.  This is particularly the case for scenario-based stress tests 
which analyze a risk model in relation to a specific set of extreme events.  However, 
an advantage of the approach we take is that it generates a loss distribution from 
which stressed values are then derived as VaR or expected shortfall.  This means that 
although the stressed events themselves cannot easily be tested the underlying loss 
distribution can be back-tested against historical data. Most financial institutions 
should have sufficient historical data in their retail portfolios to do this.  In particular, 
the loss distributions can be validated given a time series of default rates for a post 
out-of-sample data set (Granger and Huang 1997) using a binomial test.  To determine 
if the stress test is unrealistically conservative we can check if the number of observed 
default rates that exceed estimated VaR is likely to occur by chance.  For example, if 
we are considering 99% VaR, we would expect only 1% of observations to exceed 
VaR on average and the distribution of such cases is governed by the binomial 
distribution which allows us to test the significance of outcomes (Marrison 2002, 
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chapter 8).  The application of the binomial test to this problem is well-known and 
forms the basis of the traffic-light validation system used by industry and regulators 
(Blochwitz and Hohl 2007).  A potential difficulty with this approach is that the 
binomial test assumes independence between observations and this may not be the 
case for default rates on a portfolio over time.  Therefore, this assumption should be 
tested prior to using the binomial test.  Autoregression can be used to test dependency 
over the time series.  
 
3. Experimental Results 
3.1 Data 
We have two large data sets for two UK credit card products, consisting of over 
200,000 accounts each and spanning a period from 1999 to mid-2006.  The data 
consists of (1) data collected at time of application such as the applicant’s age, 
income, employment status, housing status and credit bureau score, (2) account open 
date and (3) monthly behavioural data including credit limit, outstanding balance, 
card usage and payment history: amount paid and minimum payment required.  We 
define  account default as the case when minimum payment is missed on an account 
for 3 consecutive months2.  This definition is typical in the industry and matches the 
standard specified by Basel II (BCBS 2005) of 90 days delinquency.   
 
A validation set consisting of one year of data is produced by randomly dividing each 
product data set into a training and validation data set in a 2:1 ratio of accounts, then 
discarding all records after an observation date of June 2005 from the training data set 
                                                 
2 For reasons of commercial confidentiality, we cannot reveal descriptive statistics or default rates for these data. 
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and keeping only accounts opened prior to the observation date, but considering only 
records after the observation date, for the test set.  This procedure ensures (1) there is 
no selection bias, since accounts in the validation data set are selected randomly and 
independently, (2) the validation data set is both out-of-sample and post-training data 
and (3) the validation is realistic in the sense that only accounts that are known (ie 
already open) prior to the observation date are included in the validation set. 
 
Breedon and Thomas (2008) use several macroeconomic variables in their models of 
default such as GDP, interest rate, unemployment rate, house price and consumption 
variables, such as retail sales, which they argue could impact consumer delinquency.  
Bellotti and Crook (2009) also find bank interest rates, earnings, production and house 
prices significant in explaining default for different credit card data.  We therefore 
follow with a similar set of variables described in Table 1.  Notice that production 
index is used instead of GDP since production index is available monthly in the UK 
whereas GDP is quarterly.  The difference in the value over 12 months is used for all 
variables to avoid inadvertently including a time trend or seasonal variation in the 
time series. The log value of FTSE, house prices and earnings are used in the model 
since these follow an obvious exponential trend.  Since both the behavioural and 
macroeconomic data is monthly we use discrete monthly time in the survival model. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
3.2 Factor analysis 
Table 2 shows that PCA applied to the macroeconomic time series from 1986 to June 
2006 returns 4 factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.   MF1 is loaded on a broad 
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range of economic variables, but not including FTSE index.  MF2 is loaded mainly on 
consumption variables: RPI, consumer confidence and earnings.  MF3 is driven by the 
FTSE index, although a mix of other variables also contribute to the factor.  MF4 
mirrors MF2, picking up consumption variables.   For several variables we have a 
prior expectation of sign of effect on the probability of default and these are shown in 
Table 2.  In particular, we expect greater values of interest rates, unemployment rate 
and RPI to represent increased stress on retail obligors, whereas greater values for 
production, earnings and house price should indicate improved economic conditions 
and hence a reduction of likelihood to default.  The expected effect of each MF on the 
probability of default is then also given, based on the sign of the loading of the 
variable within the factor.  We observe that only MF2 is expected to have an overall 
positive effect on default since all variables with a prior expectation are expected to 
have a positive effect in MF2 except for earnings. For other variables, we can 
hypothesize economic effects on the likelihood to default having either sign and we 
are unable to judge a priori which effect would be stronger.  So increases in equity 
prices (FTSE) are indicators of economic health which we expect to reduce default 
rates; however, they are also linked to greater consumer activity which implies greater 
use of consumer credit and possible indebtedness. Similarly, the effect of 
consumption variables, retail sales and consumer confidence, are less easy to predict.  
It is possible that increases in these variables imply a greater load on credit card 
accounts as a consequence of higher sales.  However, an opposite effect is possible 
since they also indicate improved economic confidence among consumers.  For this 
reason, we do not state a prior overall expected effect for these factors.   
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
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The movement of MFs is shown in Figure 1, extrapolating into the period of the 
financial crisis of 2008.  The previous major recession in the UK began with the stock 
market crash in October 1987.  All MFs show a large movement following this date.  
In particular, MF3 shows a sharp decline at this time and this is unsurprising given 
that the main contributor to MF3 is the FTSE index.  However MF2 has the most 
sustained upward trend for several years after the beginning of the crisis, indicating 
strain on consumption after the stock market crash.  Extrapolating into 2008, we see 
the dramatic effect of the financial crisis during this period on all MFs.  This is 
evidence that these factors are good indicators of economic stress and could be used 
for stress testing. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
We apply the Box-Cox transformation to model the factors.  Both MF1 and MF3 
require no transformation since their Box-Cox 1=λ .  However, both MF2 and MF3 
have long tails and require a transformation with 1−=λ  and 2 respectively as shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
3.3 Model fit 
Along with MFs, the models also include application and behavioural variables and 
annual indicator variables for vintage, but these will not be reported in our results 
since the main focus of this paper is the inclusion of macroeconomic conditions and 
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stress testing.  For further details about building and assessment of a survival model 
using application and macroeconomic variables for retail credit cards, see Bellotti and 
Crook (2009).  Models were built with behavioural variables lagged by 12 months in 
order to reduce the possible effect of endogeneity between behavioural data and 
default event (eg a rise in account balance and default may have a common external 
cause) and to allow for forecasts up to 12 months ahead. MFs were included with lag 
3 months since we anticipate that economic conditions contribute to default at the 
time when payments first begin to be missed.  It is possible that earlier lags could be 
used but our preliminary experiments indicated that a 3 month lag is sufficient.  For 
the Selected MF model, a significance level of 1% was chosen for stepwise variable 
selection.  This was sufficient for selection of factors whilst ensuring highly 
correlated factors are not included together. 
 
Table 3 shows MF coefficient estimates for models built on training data for each 
product.  Several factors are statistically significant in the models.  In particular, MF2 
is a strong driver in all models and has the direction of effect as expected overall, as 
shown in Table 2.  Figure 2 showed that MF2 was the strongest signal of the effect of 
the October 1987 stock market crash, hence its inclusion in the models is promising 
for stress testing.  MF3 is also a driver for product B although the size of effect is not 
as large as MF2.  There was no overall expected direction of effect for MF3: as shown 
in Table 2, three loaded variables have a positive expected effect and three with a 
negative expected effect.  However FTSE is the largest contributor to MF3 which 
implies that the strongest effect of FTSE on likelihood to default is not as an indicator 
of economic health but as an indirect indicator of consumer spending and possible 
over-indebtedness.  
Retail credit stress testing using a dynamic model with macroeconomic factors  
Bellotti and Crook 
 17 of 33 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The size of effect of MF2 is much larger in the All MF model than the Selected MF 
model.  This is a consequence of the inclusion of MF4 which has an opposite effect to 
MF2 over the period of training.  This is evident in Table 4 which shows surprisingly 
high local correlations between factors over the period 1999 to mid-2006. In 
particular, there is strong negative correlation between MF2 and MF4.  Overall, this is 
evidence of multicollinearity between MF2 and MF4 in the training time period which 
inflates the coefficient estimate of MF2.  As discussed in Section 2.3, this is not a 
problem for predictions but may be for stress testing.  Variable selection resolves this 
problem by excluding MF4 from the model.  There is no correlation between MF2 
and MF3 so the model for product B which includes both these factors is not affected 
by multicollinearity. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
3.4 Stress test results 
Models are built with an observation date of June 2005.  Stress tests are then 
performed for one year ahead, June 2006.  Figures 3 to 5 show distributions of 
estimated default rates following Monte Carlo simulation on the test set for each 
product and for stress tests using different risk factors.  We found these distributions 
converged after 50,000 simulations.  For reasons of commercial confidentiality we 
cannot report the precise default rates.  Instead we report estimated default rate as a 
ratio of the median estimated default rate computed using the Selected MF model.  
Table 5 shows statistics for each of these distributions in terms of median default rate, 
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VaR and expected shortfall.  A level of 99.9% is used since this reflects the standard 
level recommended for use in the Basel II Accord. 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
For product A we notice that the shape shown in Figure 3 is approximately the same 
for both the No MF and Selected MF models except that the No MF model tends to 
give higher estimates.  However in Figure 4 the right tail is shown in detail and 
clearly shows that the Selected MF model has the longer tail, accounting for the much 
higher estimates of VaR and expected shortfall.  For product B, the distribution is 
much broader for the Selected MF model than the No MF model and, again, the 
Selected MF model has a long tail, as shown in Figure 5.  The long tail is typical of 
loss distributions and we would expect to observe it (BIS 2005).  In the case of these 
experiments, the long tail is a consequence of including MF2 in the stress test which 
itself has a long tail (see Figure 2).  Comparing the All MF to the Selected MF models, 
we find that for both products, the distributions based on the All MF models are much 
broader, leading to relatively extreme VaR and unexpected shortfall.  This is a 
consequence of the inflated coefficient estimates caused by multicollinearity between 
MFs, rather than a genuine warning of greater risk.  Finally, we note that excluding 
estimation uncertainty as a risk factor makes very little difference to the distribution, 
even at extremes, and so for practical purposes it can be safely excluded. 
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Validation is performed using a binomial test on the post, out-of-sample validation 
data consisting of 12 months of data.  Figures 6a to 6d show time series plots of 
observed default rates, along with percentiles for the simulated distributions for each 
month.  The binomial test is based on the number of observations that are above the 
99th or 99.9th VaR.  Figures 6a and 6c show that for both products, the Selected MF 
model gives plausible distributions and the binomial test gives probability of outcome 
greater than 10%. However, the No MF model gives implausible outcome with 
probability of outcomes above VaR being less than 1%, based on Figures 6b and 6d.  
The binomial test assumes independence between observations.  We tested this 
assumption for our data using autoregression (AR(1) and AR(2)) and found no 
significant correlation for default rates over time . 
 
FIGURES 6a-6d HERE 
 
Figures 6a to 6d also show that observed default rates are higher than the median of 
the predicted values estimates for all models and approaching the 99% VaR even for 
the MF model.  This is unsurprising since there has been a generally rapid rise in 
credit card delinquency from 2005 (Bank of England 2008, Chart 2.7 shows increase 
in write-offs) and this is the case for both products that we used.  Hence, in reality, 
hitting 99% VaR is reasonable given the increased risks on many credit card 
portfolios during this period, relative to previous periods. 
 
The results suggest that the Selected MF model gives the most plausible stress test 
outcomes.  From Table 5 we see that this stress test yields a stressed value of monthly 
default rate about double the median.  A doubling of default rates is a large increase 
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but not implausible given an economic crisis. Indeed, based on data given by the Bank 
of England (2008, Chart 2.7), average write-off rates for credit cards in the UK, 
generally, were 2.5% during the relatively benign period of our training data, but rose 
to 7% during the recent financial crisis by 2007: a multiple of 2.8.  Further, in our 
experiments we find expected shortfall is 15-20% greater than VaR.  As argued earlier, 
expected shortfall is the more reasonable value to use for stress testing.  The observed 
difference is sufficiently large to support this argument empirically and to show that 
VaR should not be used as a substitute for stress testing for typically long-tailed loss 
distributions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We present an approach for stress testing retail credit portfolios using a dynamic 
model of default that includes macroeconomic conditions.  We use PCA to generate 
MFs based on several macroeconomic time series that we believe could affect 
consumer delinquency.  Since the MFs are uncorrelated3, simulated values can be 
generated for them independently and used as economic scenarios for stress testing, 
employing Monte Carlo simulation to build a distribution of estimated default rates.  
This simulation approach has the advantage that it is potentially less subjective than 
scenario based approaches and, since it generates a loss distribution, it enables an 
empirical validation step through back-testing. 
 
Our experimental results based on two large credit card portfolios show that dynamic 
models including macroeconomic conditions can be built successfully with one or two 
statistically significant MFs.  MF2 is connected to consumption variables and is found 
                                                 
3 Over the period for which they were estimated. 
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to be the strongest macroeconomic driver of default.  The inclusion of MFs is 
sufficient to produce a long tail on the simulated loss distributions.  Without MFs, the 
tail is too short and, consequently, VaR and expected shortfall are too low to be 
plausible estimates of stressed loss rates.  A binomial test is used to check the 
plausibility of loss distributions based on an out-of-sample validation data set.  We 
also discovered that although the MFs are generally uncorrelated, over a local time 
period they may be highly correlated, leading to multicollinearity in the model.  
Although this problem does not affect forecasts of expected (mean) default rates it 
does affect the use of the model for stress testing, generating much broader loss 
distributions and, consequentially, much larger VaR and expected shortfall.  We 
successfully employed variable selection to avoid this problem. 
 
The use of expected shortfall is contrasted with VaR as a measure of stressed loss.  
We find a sufficiently large difference in the two values to effect risk management 
decisions and capital requirement calculations.  Certainly, the use of expected 
shortfall is the more principled approach to calculating expected loss given worst case 
and this result reinforces the point that VaR may not be the most suitable measure for 
stress testing (BIS 2005).  We found that 99.9% expected shortfalls for the two credit 
card products A and B were 2.11 and 2.43 respectively, which are high but not 
implausible, in the light of evidence from the recent financial crisis. 
 
Our research has raised several issues that require further investigation.  Firstly, the 
model and simulation assumes that accounts are independent, conditional on 
economic circumstances.  This may not be the case and we may need to assume or 
calculate an asset correlation.  The inclusion of MFs explains some of the asset 
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correlation, but may not account for all of it.  Rösch (2003) shows a considerable 
reduction in asset correlation between accounts once macroeconomic risk factors are 
included in a model of corporate bankruptcy and Crook and Bellotti (2009) show the 
same effect for retail credit card delinquency.  Nevertheless even a small asset 
correlation, additional to economic effects, could be included as a risk factor during 
simulation and may produce more accurate distributions.  Secondly, with our 
approach we have attempted to generate economic scenarios based on random 
sampling from the historic distribution of economic conditions.  However, the 
structural development of the economy could also be modelled and used to generate 
simulations. For example, Jiménez and Mencía (2007) use vector autoregression to 
construct a structured model of the macroeconomy and other risk factors, whilst 
Hoggarth and Whitley (2003) report using a dynamic medium-term macroeconomic 
model for stress tests of UK banks.  Thirdly, empirical validation remains a problem 
for stress testing due to the inherent rarity and uniqueness of the events we are 
attempting to model.  We give a binomial test approach on the underlying loss 
distributions.  However, it is primarily a test to reject loss distributions that are clearly 
implausible.  The binomial test still cannot test the validity of extreme value estimates 
(above the 99th percentile) and therefore cannot be used to positively validate the 
plausibility of VaR and expected shortfall.  Further development of empirical tests of 
extreme values would be valuable.  For example, Wong (2009) suggests an alternative 
approach using a size of tail loss statistic instead of a binomial test and finds this has 
more statistical power. Nevertheless, a simple binomial test gives plausibility to the 
overall loss distribution, providing further confidence in their use for stress tests. 
 
Retail credit stress testing using a dynamic model with macroeconomic factors  
Bellotti and Crook 
 23 of 33 
References 
Allison, P.D. (1995).  Survival analysis using SAS.  SAS Press. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision BCBS (2005).  Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards at 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm 
 
Bank for International Settlements BIS (2005).  Stress testing at major financial 
institutions: survey results and practice.  Working report from Committee on the 
Global Financial System. 
 
Bank of England (2008).  Financial Stability Review, April 2008. 
 
Baker, D. (2009). Background on the Stress Tests: Anyone Got an Extra $120 
Billion?, Beat the Press Blog, The American Prospect, 8 May 2009   
 
Bellotti, T. and Crook J. (2009). Credit scoring with macroeconomic variables using 
survival analysis.  The Journal of the Operational Research Society (2009 ) 60, 1699-
1707. 
 
Blochwitz, S. and Hohl, S. (2007).  Validation of Banks’ Internal rating Systems – a 
Supervisory Perspective in The Basel Handbook 2nd edition ed. Ong M (Risk Books). 
 
Box, G. E. P. and Cox, D.R. (1964). An analysis of transformations. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series B 26: pp211–246 
 
Breedon, J. and Thomas, L. (2008).  A common framework for stress testing retail 
portfolios across countries.  The Journal of Risk Model Validation 2(3), 11-44. 
 
Cheng, K.F. Chu, and Hwang, R.C. (2009) Predicting bankruptcy using discrete semi-
parametric hazard models. Quantitative Finance Doi 10.1080/14697680902814274. 
 
Crook,  J. and Bellotti, T. (2009) Asset Correlations for Credit Card Defaults.  
Working paper, Credit Research Centre, University of Edinburgh Business School 
(March 2009). 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2001). CFNAI Background Release, working paper. 
 
FRS: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009).  The supervisory 
capital assessment program: overview of results.  White paper, May 7 2009，FRS. 
 
FSA: Financial Services Authority UK (2008).  Stress and scenario testing.  
Consultation paper 08/24. 
 
Gross, D. B. and Souleles, N. S. (2002).  An empirical analysis of personal 
bankruptcy and delinquency.  The Review of Financial Studies Vol 15, no 1, pp319-
347. 
 
Retail credit stress testing using a dynamic model with macroeconomic factors  
Bellotti and Crook 
 24 of 33 
Gerardi, K., Shapiro, A.H., and Willen, P. S. (2008).  Subprime outcomes: risky 
mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures.  Working paper 07-15 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
 
Granger, C. W. J. and Huang, L. L. (1997). Evaluation of panel data models: some 
suggestions from time series. Discussion paper 97-10, Department of Economics, 
University of Caliafornia, San Diego. 
 
Haldane, A.G. (2009), Why the banks failed the stress test, basis of a speech given at 
the Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing, 13 Febuary 2009, Bank of England. 
 
Hoggarth, G. and Whitley, J. (2003).  Assessing the strength of UK banks through 
macroeconomic stress tests.  Financial Stability Review, June 2003, Bank of England.  
 
Jiménez, G. and Mencía, J. (2007).  Modelling the distribution of credit losses with 
observable and latent factors.  Banco de Espana Research Paper. 
 
Joliffe, I. T. (2002). Principal component analysis. (2nd ed, Springer). 
 
Jokivuolle, E., Virolainen, K. and Vähämaa (2008).  Macro-model-based stress 
testing of Basel II capital requirements.  Bank of Finland research discussion papers 
17/2008. 
 
Marrison, C. (2002).  Fundamentals of Risk Measurement (McGraw-Hill NY). 
 
Robert, C.P. and Casella, G. (1999).  Monte Carlo Statistical Methods (Springer). 
 
Rösch, D. (2003).  Correlations and business cycles of credit risk: evidence from 
bankruptcies in Germany.  Swiss Society for Financial Market Research vol 17(3) pp 
309-331. 
 
Shumway, T. (2001) Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately, a simple hazard model. 
Journal of Business vol 74(1), 101-124. 
 
Verbeek, M. (2004).  A Guide to Modern Econometrics (2nd ed, Wiley). 
 
Wong, Woon, K. (2009), Backtesting Value-at-Risk based on tail losses, Journal of 
Empirical Finance, doi: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2009.11.004
Retail credit stress testing using a dynamic model with macroeconomic factors  
Bellotti and Crook 
 25 of 33 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. 
UK Macroeconomic Variables With Descriptive Statistics.   
Descriptive statistics  
(for difference over 12 months) 
MV Description and 
source 
Date 
available 
Min Mean SD Max 
IR UK bank interest rates 
(ONS) 
Jun 1985 -4.5 -0.43 1.90 6.5 
Unemp UK unemployment rate 
(in ‘000s) SA (ONS) 
Feb 1972 -535 -94 238 575 
Prod UK production index 
(all) (ONS) 
Jan 1968 -5.2 1.10 2.30 6 
FTSE FTSE 100 all share 
index (ONS) 
Jan 1975 -822 81 286 682 
Earnings Earnings (log) all 
including bonus (ONS) 
Jan 1990 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.038 
House 
price 
House price 
(Halifax) 
Jan 1986 -6.5% +7.9% 7.6% +26% 
Retail 
sales 
Retail sales value  
(ONS) 
Jan 1986 0.3 3.92 1.49 8.5 
RPI Retail price index (all 
items) (ONS) 
Jan 1987 1.2 4.96 2.36 12.8 
Cons conf Consumer confidence 
index (EC) 
Jan 1985 -20.3 0.7 24.2 186.8 
 
Sources are the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS), Nationwide Building Society 
(Nat) and the European Commission (EC).  Data is monthly and may be seasonally 
adjusted (SA).   
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Table 2. 
Macroeconomic Factors (MF)  
    Macroeconomic factors with expected effect (EE) 
  EE MF1 EE MF2 EE MF3 EE MF4 EE 
Eigenvalue  2.47 1.83 1.44 1.08  
Variables:     
IR + 0.80 + 0.21 + -0.03 − -0.30 − 
Unemp + -0.85 − 0.33 + 0.02 + 0.22 + 
Prod − 0.57 − -0.42 + 0.40 − -0.24 + 
FTSE  0.01  -0.11  0.84  0.01  
Earnings − 0.36 − 0.60 − 0.33 − 0.48 − 
House price − 0.64 − -0.13 + -0.36 + 0.28 − 
Retail sales  0.36  -0.26  -0.35  0.58  
RPI + 0.34 + 0.85 + 0.19 + 0.08 + 
Cons conf  -0.05  -0.56  0.42  0.48  
The factors are derived from macroeconomic data from 1986 to June 2006 using 
principal component analysis.  Only the four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 
are shown.  The direction of expected effect (EE) is shown for each variable, and its 
effect within each MF given the direction of the loading. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
Coefficients estimates for MFs for the two MF models.   
Model Variable Product A Product B 
  Estimate Chi-sq Estimate Chi-sq 
All MF MF1 -0.0325 1.1  0.00931 0.1  
 MF2 0.1429 15.3 ** 0.1659 20.1 ** 
 MF3 0.0329 5.3  0.0711 23.3 ** 
 MF4 0.0494 6.0  0.0473 4.8  
Selected  MF1 -  -   
MF MF2 0.0796 9.8 * 0.1064 16.8 ** 
 MF3 -  0.0638 26.2 ** 
 MF4 -  -   
 
Statistical significance is shown at 1% level (*) and 0.01% level (**). Note that all 
models also included application and behavioural variables but coefficient estimates 
for these are not shown. 
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Table 4.  
Correlation Coefficients Between Macroeconomic Factors (MF) Within Training 
period 
 MF1 MF2 MF3 
MF2 -0.01   
MF3 0.32 * 0.023  
MF4 0.15 -0.6 * -0.38 * 
 
Training period is 1999 to June 2005.  Statistical significance is shown at 1% level 
(*). 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.   
Estimated Default Rates For The Loss Distributions Shown In Figures 3 To 5.   
  Model and risk factors 
 Observed No
MF 
All 
MF 
Selected 
MF 
Selected MF 
(no est. unc.) 
Product A: 1.41     
Median  1.09 1.04 1 1 
VaR  1.50 2.84 1.83 1.79 
Expected shortfall  1.54 4.66 2.11 2.15 
Product B: 1.32     
Median  0.95 1.03 1 1 
VaR  1.24 3.22 2.01 1.98 
Expected shortfall  1.27 4.59 2.43 2.31 
 
Estimated default rates are shown as a ratio to the median default rate given the 
Selected MF model.  VaR and expected shortfall are given for the 99.9%ile.
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Figure 1.  
Movement of Macroeconomic Factors Over Time. 
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Figure 2.  Distribution Of Historic MF2 (Left) And MF3 (Right) Values Along 
With Optimal Box-Cox Transformation Distribution. 
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Figure 3.   
Loss distributions for product A for June 2006. 
 
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Estimated default rate (as ratio of median for the selected MF model)
Residuals only Selected MF model
Selected MF (no estimation uncertainty) All MF model
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.   
Extreme Right Tail Of Loss Distributions For Product A For June 2006. 
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Figure 5.  
Loss Distributions For Product B For June 2006. 
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Figure 6a.   
Time Series Of Loss Distribution For Product A Given The Selected MF Model. 
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  The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality. 
 
 
 
Figure 6b.   
Time Series Of Loss Distribution For Product A Given The No MF Model.   
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The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality. 
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Figure 6c.   
Time Series Of Loss Distribution For Product B Given The Selected MF Model.   
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The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6d.   
Time Series Of Loss Distribution For Product B Given The No MF Model.   
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The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality. 
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